There were no exceptionally unusual Russian mobile forces massed along the Soviet/Reich-occupied border during 1941. In fact, Stalin pulled a number of forces back from the very border itself while a transition was being made between the partly abandoned Stalin Line and the (further west) newly developed but still unfinished Molotov Line of border defenses. Almost everything Stalin did in mid 1941 before June 22 reeked of two things: A heavy application of desperate appeasement towards Hitler and secondly, a lackluster defense preparation that was a pragmatic minimum whose absence would be too much to justify even by appeasement standards.
It's amazing how much Viktor Suvorov's completely discredited book and its arguments still carry weight with many people today. There was NO serious Soviet invasion plan of what Germany controlled in 1941, only hypothetical scenario planning and poorly designed plans for near future offensive power. The one thing the USSR was doing right however, as part of a more general strategy was gearing up a massive rearmament and war production program. This had been in progress since even before 1939 but only really picked up steam in the early 1940s.
It's amazing how much Viktor Suvorov's completely discredited book and its arguments still carry weight with many people today. There was NO serious Soviet invasion plan of what Germany controlled in 1941, only hypothetical scenario planning and poorly designed plans for near future offensive power. The one thing the USSR was doing right however, as part of a more general strategy was gearing up a massive rearmament and war production program. This had been in progress since even before 1939 but only really picked up steam in the early 1940s.